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LEGAL UPDATES

 

 

COLLISON & COLLISON, P.C. (Vol. IV, Issue 4) April, 2004

 

This newsletter has been compiled utilizing the latest reported Michigan Court of Appeals and Supreme Court Decisions. Case citations (if published at the time this newsletter is distributed) will reference the specific reporter, volume and page number. Unpublished Decisions (or those which have not been published as of the date of newsletter distribution) will be cited by Appellate Slip Opinion number. Copies of all Decisions summarized within this newsletter are available for your review upon request. Questions and comments are welcomed.

 

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NO-FAULT

 

Nothing in the plain language of MCL 500.3101(1) excuses an owner of a vehicle from maintaining insurance, even if another owner of the same vehicle has already obtained such insurance.

 

Facts Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle which she owned, but was selling to the driver on installment payments. Plaintiff did not maintain insurance on the vehicle. The purchaser had insured the automobile with Farmers. Plaintiff was not named as an insured on that policy. She sustained injuries when the vehicle hit a deer.

 

Plaintiff sought personal injury protection benefits from the Defendant based on her status as a passenger. Although Defendant initially paid benefits, same were discontinued.

 

In reversing the Trial Court’s denial of Summary Disposition in favor of Defendant, the Court of Appeals held that, by statute, the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle must maintain insurance. The "owner" of a vehicle includes the person who holds the legal title, or a person who has an immediate right of possession under an installment sales contract. More than one person can be considered the owner of a vehicle for purposes of MCL 500.3101(2)(g). A person is not entitled to PIP benefits if he or she was the owner or registrant of a vehicle for which insurance was not maintained as required. Nothing in the plain language of MCL 500.3101(1) excuses the owner of a vehicle from maintaining insurance even if another owner of the same vehicle has obtained such insurance. As such, Plaintiff was not entitled to any further benefits under the Farmers policy. Nidy v Farmers Insurance Exchange, Michigan Court of Appeals Unpublished Decision dated March 18, 2004, Docket No. 245134.

 

Recommendation – This case involves a plain reading of Section 3101 of the No-Fault Code. As illustrated above, not only it is very important to determine whether the claimant was the owner of the vehicle involved, but also that claimant had the required mandatory insurance coverage in effect on the date of loss.

 

 

 

Replacing a tire is necessary to allow for the operation of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. The requirement that an item be attached, is related to the Parked Vehicle Provision, which is not applicable to injuries arising out of vehicle maintenance.

 

Facts Plaintiff received an eye injury when a truck tire he was working on exploded. He sought PIP benefits under MCL 500.3105, asserting that he sustained his injury while performing maintenance work on a motor vehicle. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition finding that the fact that the tire was not attached to the vehicle at the time of the accident established that Plaintiff’s injury was not within the scope of the statute.

 

In reversing the lower Court, the Court of Appeals held that where an injury arises out of the maintenance of a parked vehicle, a claimant may recover under MCL 500.3105(1) without regard to the Parked Vehicle Provisions in MCL 500.3106. Cloum v Progressive Michigan Insurance Company, Michigan Court of Appeals Unpublished Decision dated March 18, 2004, Docket No. 245071.

 

Recommendation This case was distinguished from the scenario in Central Mutual Insurance Company v Walter, 143 Mich App 332 (1985) (where fuel leaking from an automobile brought into a gas station for repairs was ignited by a water heater and set fire to the premises). The Court in that case found that the fire did not arise out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle because there was no causal connection between the vehicle being maintained and the source of the ignition, since the water heater was totally unrelated to the work of servicing automobiles. Initial discovery should focus on the issue of proximate cause.

 

 

MCL 500.3145(1), requires that a notice of injury include the nature of injury.

 

Facts Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. A lawsuit was commenced within the one-year statute of limitations. The case was eventually settled. Approximately nine years after the original accident, Plaintiff initiated the present action alleging that she suffered injuries and work loss as a result of the prior incident. Although not specifically stated in the Complaint, Plaintiff sought benefits related to a closed head injury which she attributed to that event. In upholding the Trial Court’s grant of Summary Disposition, the Court of Appeals (in a 2-1 Decision) found that the claim for closed head injury was time-barred. Under MCL 500.3145(1), Plaintiff must give notice of injury. The plain language of the statute mandates that the nature of the injury must be indicated for the insurer to be properly notified. Michigan Courts have consistently held that providing notice of an injury is insufficient to provide the insurer with a basis for evaluation of a claim. A claim for specific benefits must be submitted. Notice must be specific enough to inform the insurer of the nature of the loss.

 

Here, Plaintiff’s original claim and action did not include a closed head injury or any head injury. Consequently, Plaintiff did not notify Defendant of the injury for which she sought benefits by way of this action. The statutory period of limitations in the No-Fault Act applies to bar actions that do not comply with its provisions. The fact that medical expenses are a lifetime benefit does not mean that the limitation period can be disregarded. Ross v Allstate Insurance Company, Michigan Court of Appeals Unpublished Decision dated March 9, 2004, Docket No. 245165.

 

Recommendation When evaluating a first-party claim, one should review the initial Application for Benefits as well as medical records submitted and/or obtained. Arguably, if an insured claims a "new injury" beyond the applicable statute of limitations, same may be precluded from recovery.

 

 

It is not necessary that a person has actually used a vehicle for 30 days before a finding may be made that the person is the owner. Rather, the focus must be on the nature of the person’s right to use the vehicle.

 

Facts Five days before his fatal accident, Decedent purchased a pick-up truck from a friend for the total sum of $600.00. Decedent gave his friend $300.00 and was to pay the remainder at a later date. Decedent took possession of the vehicle, but the title was not signed over because of the incomplete payment. There was no insurance policy listing the vehicle.

 

At the time of the accident, Decedent was living with his grandfather who had a policy issued by the Defendant covering his vehicles. As a relative residing in the same household, Decedent could potentially obtain benefits under his grandfather’s policy. The Personal Representative of Decedent’s estate brought suit against MIC General, claiming both personal protection insurance benefits and uninsured motorist coverage. The Circuit Court held that the deceased was covered by the policy for both PIP and UM benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a Published Opinion.

 

In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Michigan Supreme Court held that MCL 500.3101(2)(g)( i ) defines an "owner" as a person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof for a period that is greater than 30 days. Nothing in the plain language of that statute requires that a person has at any time actually used the vehicle or that the person has commenced using the vehicle at least 30 days before the accident occurred. The statute merely contemplates a situation in which the person is renting or using a vehicle for a period that is greater than 30 days.

 

Accordingly, if the lease or other arrangement under which the person has use of the vehicle is such that the right of use will extend beyond 30 days, that person is an "owner" from the inception of the arrangement, regardless of whether a 30-day period has expired.

 

In this case, the arrangement between the seller and the deceased was for a permanent transfer of ownership, and it contemplated that the deceased would have exclusive use of the truck permanently. The fact that the accident occurred before the expiration of 30 days does not affect the nature of the deceased’s interest in the vehicle.

 

With respect to the issue of uninsured motorist benefits, the Court held that although Decedent was an insured because he was residing with his grandfather (the policyholder), the vehicle involved in the accident was not covered by the policy, and coverage would be excluded if Decedent owned the vehicle. Decedent had possession and control over the vehicle as well as dominion and authority over it. Thus, he would commonly be understood to have owned it at the time of the accident. As such uninsured motorist benefits were not recoverable under the policy. Twichel v MIC General Insurance Corporation, 469 Mich 524 (2004).

 

Recommendation This Decision is significant from the standpoint that the statute has been interpreted to simply contemplate a situation in which a person will be renting or using a vehicle for a period that is greater than 30 days. Additionally, the Court reiterated the longstanding view that where a term is not defined in an insurance policy, it is accorded its commonly understood meaning. Given the above guidelines, a more detailed inquiry should be made where an insured’s claim may be affected by virtue of his or her ownership of the involved vehicle.

 

 

PREMISES LIABILITY

 

The "totality of the circumstances" surrounding a staircase and loft when taken in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, made a stairway unreasonably dangerous even when used with reasonable and ordinary care.

 

Facts Plaintiff was injured when she fell down a flight of stairs as she attempted to traverse them in the dark while spending the night at Defendant’s inn. Plaintiff argued that defects in the stairs, stairway and loft were not open and obvious, that there were "special aspects" of the condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm. Further, that Defendants violated BOCA standards, and that the premises was not fit for the purposes intended. After reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeals found that the dangers associated with the stairs, staircase, and loft were open and obvious. They also found that the claimed inadequacies in the aggregate, coupled with the necessary use of the stairs, stairway and loft in their dangerous state, constituted "special aspects" creating an issue of fact for the jury regarding whether the risk of harm was unreasonable. In addition, the specific statutory duty imposed upon Defendants by MCL554.139(1)(a) and (b) preempts the application of the open and obvious doctrine at the Summary Disposition stage to defeat Plaintiff’s liability claim predicated on defective residential premises.

 

The Court found that an average person of ordinary intelligence upon casual inspection would have noticed the overall layout of the stairway, including the narrow and steep stairs, their relationship to the low-ceilinged loft, the open unguarded area between the loft guardrail and the edge of the steps, the open-sided staircase, the limited tree branch fashioned into a handrail, and the lack of a light switch at the top of the stairs. Plaintiff’s argument that these dangers were unknown to her due to darkness was not persuasive. She had viewed the stairs and loft when she was in the main floor of the cabin earlier in the evening when the overhead light was illuminated, and she traversed the stairs when she retired to bed. However, the Court felt that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the staircase and loft when taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, made the stairs unreasonably dangerous, even when used with reasonable and ordinary care. In this case, there was a means of avoiding injury (handrail), but the means was inadequate.

 

The open and obvious doctrine is not available to deny liability to an injured invitee or licensee on leased or licensed residential premises when such premises presents a material breach of the specific statutory duty imposed on owners of residential property to maintain their premises in reasonable repair in accordance with the health and safety laws as provided by statute. O’Donnell v Garasic, Michigan Court of Appeals Published Decision dated December 9, 2003, Docket No. 241341.

 

Recommendation The interesting portion of this Decision is that the Court felt that an unlit stairway (which Plaintiff had previously traversed while lit) was an open and obvious condition. If not for the unusual layout, the Trial Court’s grant of Summary Disposition in favor of the Defendant might have been upheld. Preliminary investigation should focus on the claimant’s familiarity with the condition allegedly causing injury. Where property owners are obligated by statute to maintain the premises, specific code violations should also be explored. The opinion of a local building inspector may well assist in that regard.

 

Should you have any questions or comments regarding this or any of our newsletters, please feel free to contact us by voice 989.799.3033, e-mail jtc@saginaw-law.com or write to Collison & Collison, P.C., 5811 Colony Drive, North, P.O. Box 6010, Saginaw, MI 48608-6010.

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